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Abstract. The McEliece cryptosystem is one of the oldest public-key cryptosystem ever designated. It
is also the first public-key cryptosystem based on linear error-correcting codes. The main advantage of
the McEliece cryptosystem is to have a very fast encryption and decryption functions but suffers from a
major drawback. It requires a very large public key which makes it very difficult to use in many practical
situations. In this paper we propose a new general way to reduce the public key size through quasi-cyclic
codes. Our construction introduces a new method of hiding the structure of the secret generator matrix
by first choosing a subfield subcode of a quasi-cyclic code that is defined over a large alphabet and then
by randomly shortening the chosen subcode. The security of our variant is related to the hardness of
decoding a random quasi-cyclic code. We introduce a new decisional problem that is associated to the
decoding of an arbitrary quasi-cyclic code. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem. Starting from
subfield subcodes of quasi-cyclic generalized Reed-Solomon codes, we propose a system with several size
of parameters from 6,000 to 11,000 bits with a security ranging from 280 to 2107. Implementations of
our proposal show that we can encrypt at a speed of 120 Mbits/s (or one octet for 120 cycles). Hence
our new proposal represents the most competitive public-key cryptosystem.
Keywords : public-key cryptography, McEliece cryptosystem, alternant code, quasi-cyclic.
1 Introduction
The McEliece cryptosystem [18] represents one of the oldest public-key cryptosystem ever des-
ignated. It is also the first public-key cryptosystem based on linear error-correcting codes. The
principle is to select a linear code of length n and dimension t that is able to efficiently correct t
errors. The core idea is to transform it to a random-looking linear code. A description of the original
code and the transformations can serve as the private key while a description of the modified code
serves as the public key. McEliece’s original proposal uses a generator matrix of a binary Goppa
code. The encryption function encodes a message according to the public code and adds an error
vector of weight t. The decryption function basically decodes the ciphertext by recovering the secret
code through the trapdoor which consists of the transformations. Niederreiter [20] also proposed
a public-key cryptosystem based on linear codes in which the public key is a parity-check matrix.
It is proved in [16] that these two systems are equivalent in terms of security. It relies upon two
kinds of attacks that seek from the public data to either totally break the system, or to decrypt an
arbitrary ciphertext. Any cryptosystem that is resistant to these attacks is to said to be one-way se-
cure under a chosen plaintext attack (OW-CPA). The first category of attacks which are also called
structural attacks in code-based cryptography aims at recovering the secret code or alternatively,
constructing an equivalent code that can be efficiently decoded. The other class of attacks try to
design decoding algorithms for arbitrary linear codes in order to decrypt a given cipher text. Such
an attack is called a decoding attack. The most efficient algorithms used to decode arbitrary linear
codes are based on the information set decoding. A first analysis was done by McEliece in [18] then
in [14, 15, 27] and lastly in [8] which is the best refinement up to now. All these algorithms solve
the famous search problem of decoding random linear code. It was proved in [5] that decoding an
arbitrary linear code is NP-Hard problem. However the security of the McEliece cryptosystem is
not equivalent to the general problem of decoding random linear code due to the following reasons:
1) inverting the McEliece encryption function is a special case of the general problem of decoding
where the error weight t is set to a certain value and (2) binary Goppa codes form a subclass of
linear codes. Therefore, McEliece cryptosystem is secure as long as there is no efficient algorithm
that distinguishes between binary Goppa codes and random binary codes. Nobody has managed to
solve this challenging problem for the last thirty years and if ever a solution appears towards that
direction, this would toll the knell of the original McEliece cryptosystem. Note that this assumption
is not always true for any class of codes that has an efficient decoding algorithm. For instance,
Sidel’nikov and Shestakov proved in [26] that the structure of Generalised Reed-Solomon codes of
length n can be recovered in O
(
n4
)
. Sendrier proved that the (permutation) transformation can
be extracted for concatenated codes. Minder and Shokrollahi presented in [19] a structural attack
that creates a private key against a cryptosystem based on Reed-Muller codes [25]. Despite these
attacks on these variants of the McEliece cryptosystem, the original scheme still remains unbroken.
The other main advantages of code-based cryptosystems are twofold:
1. high-speed encryption and decryption compared with other public-key cryptosystems which
involve for instance modular exponentiations (even faster than the NTRU cryptosystem),
2. resistance to a putative quantum computer.
Unfortunately its major weakness is a huge public key of several hundred thousand bits in general.
Currently, the McEliece public key cryptosystem satisfies OW-CPA for n ≥ 2048 with appropriate
values for t and k such that Wf (2, n, k, t) ≥ 2
100 where Wf (q, n, k, t) is the work factor of the
best algorithm that decodes t errors with any linear code of length n, dimension k over the finite
Fq. For example the work factor is around 2
106 if we choose (n, k, t) = (2048, 1278, 70). For such
parameters, the public key size is about 2.5 Mbits. It is therefore tempting to enhance the McEliece
cryptosystem by finding a way to reduce the representation of a linear code as well as the matrices
of the transformations.
A possible solution is to take very sparse matrices. This idea has been applied in [7] which
examined the implications of using low density parity-check (LDPC) codes. The authors showed
that taking sparse matrices for the linear transformations is an unsafe solution. Another recent
trend first appeared in [11] tries to use quasi-cyclic codes [11, 1, 13, 12, 9]. This particular family of
codes offers the advantage of having a very simple and compact description. The first proposal [11]
uses subcodes of a primitive BCH cyclic code. The size of the public key for this cryptosystem is
only 12Kbits. The other one [1] tries to combine these two positive aspects by requiring quasi-cyclic
LDPC codes. The authors propose a public key size that is about 48Kbits. A recent work shows
[21] that these two cryptosystems [11, 1] can be totally broken. The main drawbacks of [11] are: (1)
the permutation that is supposed to hide the secret generator matrix is very constrained, (2) the
use of sub-codes of a completely known BCH code. Combining these two flaws lead to a structural
attack that recovers the secret permutation by basically solving an over-constrained linear system.
The unique solution reveals the secret key.
This present work generalizes and strengthens the point of view developped in [11] on the use
of quasi-cyclic code to reduce the size of the public key in the MacEliece scheme. In particular it
develops new ideas which permit to overcome the weaknesses of this latter protocol. Our proposal is
based on a general construction that starts from a family of MDS quasi-cyclic codes. We instantiate
our general approach through generalised Reed-Solomon codes which represent an important family
of cyclic codes equipped with an efficient decoding algorithm. The two main threats that may un-
dermine the security of our variant are the attack of [26], which exploits the structure of generalised
Reed-Solomon codes, and the attack of [21] which makes profit of the quasi-cyclic structure. Our
first improvement over [11] consists in taking subfield subcodes of generalised Reed-Solomon codes
rather than considering subcodes of a BCH code. Subfield subcodes of generalised Reed-Solomon
codes are also called alternant codes. This approach respects in a sense the McEliece’s proposal
since binary Goppa codes are a special case of alternant codes. The first positive effect for using
quasi-cyclic alternant codes is the high number of codes that share the same parameters. The second
positive effect is to be immune to the structural attack of [26] which strictly requires generalised
Reed-Solomon codes to successfully operate. Consequently, the use of alternant codes permits to
break the Reed-Solomon structure and avoids the classical Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [26]. The
second improvement consists in resisting to the attack of [21] by randomly shortening a very long
quasi-cyclic alternant codes. For instance, one constructs codes of lengths of order 1, 000 from codes
of length 216 or 220. Note that the idea of randomly shortening a code is a new way of hiding the
structure of code which exploits the recent result of [28] in which it is proved that deciding whether
a code is permutation equivalent to a shortened code is NP-complete. Hence the introduction of
the random shortening operation makes harder the recovery of the code structure in two comple-
mentary ways. First, it worsens the chances of the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack because the original
generalised Reed-Solomon code is even more “degraded”. Second, the use a random shortened code
permits to avoid the attack [21] that exploits the quasi-cyclic structure since it requires the public
code to be permutation equivalent to a subcode of a known code. The fact of considering a random
shorter code makes it inapplicable because the shortened code to which the public code is equiva-
lent is unknown to any attacker. These two improvements underly the assumption that there is no
efficient algorithm that is able to distinguish between a randomly shortened quasi-cyclic alternant
code and random quasi-cyclic linear code.
The main achievement of this paper is to derive a construction which drastically reduces the
size of the public key of the McEliece and Niederreiter cyrptosystem to about thousands bits.
The security of our new variant assumes that there is no efficient algorithm that distinguishes
between a randomly shortened quasi-cyclic alternant code and random quasi-cyclic linear code.
Assuming that is computationally impossible to distinguish between a randomly shortened quasi-
cyclic alternant code and random quasi-cyclic linear code, the one-wayness under chosen plaintext
attack is guaranteed by the hardness to decode an arbitrary quasi-cyclic linear code. We prove that
the associated decisional problem is NP-complete as it is the case for arbitrary linear codes. This
important result makes it reasonable to assume that there is no efficient algorithm that decode any
arbitrary quasi-cyclic code. This important fact establishes the security of our variant.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic facts for code-based cryptography.
In Section 3 we summarize the coding tools we use for our new algorithm: quasi-cyclic codes,
generalized Reed-Solomon codes and alternant codes. In Section 4 we deal with a description of the
protocol and in Sections 5 we give parameters for our scheme and study its performance. In Section
6 we consider the security of the scheme.
2 Code-Based Cryptography
2.1 Public-Key Cryptography
A public-key cryptosystem uses a trapdoor one-way function E that will serve as the encryption
function. The calculation of the inverse E−1 also called the decryption function is only possible
thanks to a secret (the trapdoor) K. This concept of trapdoor one-way function forms the basis of
the public-key cryptography in which the private key is K and the public key is E. More precisely
a public-key cryptosystem should provide three algorithms namely KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt
algorithms. KeyGen is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which given an input 1κ, where
κ ≥ 0 is a security parameter, outputs a pair (pk, sk) of public/private key. The KeyGen also specifies
a finite message space Mpk. The Encrypt is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on inputs
1κ, pk and a word x in Mpk outputs a word c. The decryption is a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm that on inputs 1κ, sk and a word c outputs a word x. The cryptosystem should satisfy
the correctness property which means that the decryption must undo the encryption.
2.2 McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece cryptosystem [18] utilizes error-correcting codes that have an efficient decoding al-
gorithm in order to build trapdoor one-way functions. We refer the reader to [17] for a detailed
treatment of coding theory. McEliece proposed binary Goppa codes as the underlying family of
codes. The parameters of a binary Goppa code are [2m, 2m − mt,≥ 2t + 1] where m and t are
non-negative integers. Additionally, a binary Goppa code can be decoded by an efficient t-bounded
decoding algorithm [17]. The principle of the McEliece cryptosystem is to randomly pick a code C
among the family of binary Goppa codes. The private key is the Goppa polynomial of C . The public
key will be a generator matrix that is obtained from the private key and by two random linear trans-
formations: the scrambling transformation S, which sends the secret matrix G to another generator
matrix, and a permutation transformation which reorders the columns of the secret matrix. Figure
1 and Figure 2 give details of the three algorithms. The role of these transformation is to hide any
visible structure that may characterise the code C . Therefore, McEliece encryption scheme resists
to a total break as long as it is impossible to distinguish between a permuted Goppa code and a
random linear code. Based on this fact, the other security assumption is the One-Wayness of the
McEliece encryption function. This is due to two facts: it is proven in [5] that decoding a random
linear code is NP-Hard, and second the best known algorithms, which are based on information set
decoding, [8] and [23, Volume I, Chapter 7] operate exponentially with the length n and the rate
of the underlying code (see also [10]). We denote by Wf (q, n, k, t) the number of binary operations
(also called the work factor) of the best known algorithm for decoding t errors with a random linear
code of length n and dimension k over Fq. Currently, the McEliece public key cryptosystem satisfies
OW-CPA for n ≥ 2048 with appropriate values for t and k such that Wf (2, n, k, t) ≥ 2
100. An
example of values is (n, k, t) = (2048, 1278, 70) because in that case the work factor is around 2106.
For such parameters, the public key size is about 2.5 Megabits.
Fig. 1. Key generation algorithm of the McEliece cryptosystem
KeyGen(1κ)
1. Choose n, k and t such that Wf (2, n, k, t)) ≥ 2
κ
2. Randomly pick a generator matrix G0 of an [n, k, 2t+ 1] binary Goppa code C
3. Randomly pick a n× n permutation matrix P
4. Randomly pick a k × k invertible matrix S
5. Calculate G = S ×G0 × P
6. Output pk = (G, t) and sk = (S,G0,P , γ) where γ is a t-bounded decoding algorithm of C
Fig. 2. Encryption and decryption algorithms of the McEliece cryptosystem
Encrypt(pk,m ∈ Fk2)
1. Randomly pick e in F2 of weight t
2. Calculate c = m ×G + e
3. Output c
Decrypt(sk,c ∈ Fn2 )
1. Calculate z = c × P−1
2. Calculate y = γ(z)
3. Output m = y × S−1
2.3 Niederreiter Cryptosystem
A dual encryption scheme is the Niederreiter cryptosystem [20] which is equivalent in terms of se-
curity [16] to the McEliece cryptosystem. The main difference between McEliece and Niederreiter
cryptosystems lies in the description of the codes. The Niederreiter encryption scheme describes
codes through parity-check matrices. But both schemes has to hide any structure through a scram-
bling transformation and a permutation transformation. The encryption algorithm takes as input
words of weight t where t is the number of errors that can be decoded. We denote by Wq,n,t the
words of Fnq of weight t. Figure 3 and Figure 4 give details of the three algorithms.
Fig. 3. Key generation algorithm of the Niederreiter cryptosystem
KeyGen(1κ)
1. Choose n, k and t such that Wf (2, n, k, t) ≥ 2
κ
2. Randomly pick a (n− k)× n parity-check matrix H0 of an [n, k, 2t+ 1] binary Goppa code C
3. Randomly pick a n× n permutation matrix P
4. Randomly pick a (n− k)× (n− k) invertible matrix S
5. Calculate H = S ×H0 × P
6. Output pk = (H , t) and sk = (S,H0,P , γ) where γ is a t-bounded decoding algorithm of C
Fig. 4. Encryption and decryption algorithms of the Niederreiter cryptosystem
Encrypt(pk,m ∈ W2,n,t)
1. Calculate c = H ×mT
2. Output c
Decrypt(sk,c ∈ Fn−k2 )
1. Calculate z = S−1 × c
2. Calculate y = γ(z)
3. Output m = y × P
2.4 Security of the McEliece Cryptosystem
Any public-key cryptosystem primarily requires to be resistant against an attacker that manages
either to totally break the cryptosystem which consists in extracting the private data given only
public data, or is able to invert the trapdoor encryption function given the ciphertexts of his choice
and public data. This second security notion is also named OW-CPA forOne-Wayness under Chosen
Plaintext Attack.
Total Break. If we consider irreducible binary Goppa codes then there is no efficient algorithm
that extracts the secret key from the public key in the McEliece or the Niederreiter cryptosystem
provided that weak keys are avoided. Additionally, there is no efficient algorithm which is able to
distinguish between matrices defined by the public keys and random matrices. In order words, there
is no algorithm which can efficiently solve the Goppa code distinguishing.
Definition 1 (Goppa code distinguishing). Given a binary r× n matrix H, does H defines a
binary Goppa codes?
In order to define another important decisional problem, namely the code equivalence problem, we
need some notations. We denote by Diag(v) the square matrix whose diagonal is v = (v1, . . . , vn)
and all the other entries are zero. The symmetric group Sn of order n is the set of permutations of
Jn = {1, . . . , n}. For any σ ∈ Sn, we denote by P σ = [pi,j ] the n × n matrix such that pi,j = 1 if
σ(i) = j and pi,j = 0 otherwise. We define another important decisional problem.
Definition 2 (Code equivalence). Given two k× n matrices G and G′ over Fq, does there exist
a permutation σ ∈ Sn, an n-tuple λ in F
n
q and an invertible k × k matrix S such that G
′ =
S ×G× Diag(λ)× Pσ?
In the special case where Diag(λ) is equal to In, the code equivalence problem is called the per-
mutation equivalence problem. This latter problem actually reduces in the worst case to the graph
isomorphism [22] which is conjectured to be in NP\P. The support splitting algorithm [24] was de-
signed to solve it for the special case where the monomial transformation is exactly a permutation.
Even if its complexity depends exponentially on the dimension of C ∩C⊥, this algorithm efficiently
finds the permutation in practise. Based upon these facts, the best algorithm up to now that solves
the Goppa code distinguishing consists in enumerating Goppa polynomials of degree ≤ 2t over Fq
and, by means of the support splitting algorithm, checking whether the corresponding Goppa code
is permutation equivalent to the code defined by the public key. This strategy has time complexity
O
(
n2t(1 + o(1))
)
.
On the One-Wayness. The one-wayness property is the weakest security notion that any public-
key cryptosystem must satisfy. It essentially states that inverting the encryption function is compu-
tationally impossible without a secret called the trapdoor. In the case of McEliece (or Niederreiter)
cryptosystem, it consists in decoding a given word into a codeword of the public code. Another
equivalent way of stating this problem is the syndrome decoding problem which constitutes an im-
portant algorithmic problem that we encounter in coding theory. It was proved NP-Complete in
[5].
Definition 3 (Syndrome decoding). Given an r×n matrix H over Fq, a positive integer w ≤ n
and an r-tuple z in Frq, does there exist e in F
n
q such that wt(e) ≤ w and H × e
T = z?
This important result means that decoding an arbitrary linear code is difficult (in the worst case).
The issue of decoding can also be translated into the problem of finding a low-weight codeword in
an appropriate code. We assume that we encrypt by means of the McEliece cryptosystem. We have
a public generator G and a given ciphertext z. We know that there exist a codeword c in C and
a vector e ∈ Fnq of weight t such that z = c + e. By hypothesis, the minimum distance of C is
2t+1. Therefore the linear code C˜ defined by the generator matrix G˜ =
[
G
c
]
contains a codeword
of weight t namely e. Thus inverting the encryption amounts to find codewords of low weight in a
given code. We know that this problem is NP-Hard for an arbitrary linear code. Moreover, all the
practical existing algorithms operates exponentially with length and the rate of the considered code.
Currently, the most efficient one is the Canteaut-Chabaud’s algorithm [8] which is an improvement
upon Stern’s algorithm [27]. We denote by Wf (q, n, k, t) the work factor of this algorithm. Note
that we can approximate Wf (q, n, k, t) ≤ log
2
2(q)×Wf (2, n, k, t).
3 Coding Theory Background
3.1 Quasi-cyclic Codes
Definition 4. A circulant matrix M is an ℓ× ℓ matrix obtained by cyclically right shifting the first
row:
M =


m0 m1 · · · mℓ−1
mℓ−1 m0 · · · mℓ−2
...
. . .
. . .
...
m1 · · · mℓ−1 m0

 . (1)
Definition 5. A linear code C of length n = ℓn0 is a quasi-cyclic code of order ℓ (and index n0)
if C is generated by a parity-check matrix H = [H i,j ] where each H i,j is an ℓ× ℓ circulant matrix.
Note that a code C is cyclic if for any c in C the cyclic shift (cn, c1, . . . , cn−1) also belongs to C .
A cyclic code is therefore a quasi-cyclic code of any order ℓ which divides n. The interest of circulant
matrices comes from the fact they are completely described by their first row. Hence, through such
matrices, quasi-cyclic codes admit a very compact representation which is almost linear with the
code length. We now describe from [2, 4, 3] several linear transformations that will serve us to obtain
a family of quasi-cyclic codes starting from a unique quasi-cyclic code.
Definition 6 (Shortened code). Let C be a code of length n defined by a parity-check matrix
H. Consider a subset J ′ of Jn of cardinality n
′ < n and define H(J ′) to be the matrix obtained by
deleting columns of H that are not in J ′. The parity-check matrix H(J ′) defines the shortened code
C (J ′) over J ′.
Remark: Recall that for T a set of coordinates, if one denotes by CT the code C shortened in
T and by CT the code punctured on T (deleting columns corresponding to coordinates of T ) then
(C⊥)T = (C
T )⊥. This equality relates a punctured code with its shortened dual.
The following lemma sums up the transformation we will apply on our codes:
Lemma 1. Let C be a quasi-cyclic code of length n = ℓn0 and of order ℓ defined by a parity-check
matrix H = [H i,j ] where each H i,j is an ℓ× ℓ circulant matrix.
1. Let J be a subset of Jn0 and let H
′ be the parity-check matrix obtained after deleting circulant
matrices H i,j such that j does not belong to J . The code defined by H
′ is a quasi-cyclic code of
order ℓ.
2. Define the Kronecker product A⊗B of two matrices A and B as the matrix [ai,jB]. Let a be
an n0-tuple of elements in Fq. The parity-check matrix H× (Diag(a)⊗ Iℓ) defines a quasi-cyclic
code of order ℓ.
3. Assume that there exists α in Fq such that α
ℓ = 1, then H×
(
In0 ⊗ Diag(1, α, . . . , α
ℓ−1)
)
defines
the parity-check matrix of a quasi-cyclic code of order ℓ.
4. Let Pπ be a permutation in Sn0, then the code defined by the parity-check matrix H × (P π ⊗ Iℓ)
is quasi-cyclic of order ℓ.
5. Set Tℓ as the cyclic shift defined by Tℓ(v) = (vℓ, v1, . . . , vℓ−1) for any v ∈ F
ℓ
q. Denote by Tℓ the
cyclic group generated by Tℓ. Let Pσ1 , . . . , Pσn0 be n0 permutations of Tℓ. The code defined by
the following parity-check matrix is quasi-cyclic of order ℓ:
H ×


Pσ1 0
. . .
0 Pσn0

 .
Definition 7. Any code obtained by successively applying transformations of Lemma 1 to a code C
is denoted by C (J,a, α, Pπ, Pσ1 , . . . , Pσn0 ).
3.2 Generalised Reed-Solomon Codes
Definition 8. Let α be a primitive element of Fq and assume that n = q − 1. The Reed-Solomon
code Rk,n is the code of length n and dimension k over Fq defined by the parity-check matrix
H =


1 α α2 · · · αn−1
1 α2 (α2)2 · · · (α2)n−1
...
...
...
...
1 αd−1 (αd−1)2 (αd−1)n−1

 (2)
where d = n− k + 1.
Reed-Solomon codes represent an important class of cyclic codes. It is well-known that d = n −
k+1 is actually its minimum distance. Moreover, Reed-Solomon codes admit a t-bounded decoding
algorithm as long as 2t ≤ d−1. They can also be seen as a sub-family of Generalised Reed-Solomon
codes.
Definition 9. Let λ be an n-tuple of nonzero elements in Fq where n < q and let v be an n-tuple
of distinct elements in Fq. The Generalised Reed-Solomon Gk(v,λ) code over Fq of length n and
dimension k is the code defined by the following parity-check matrix where d = n− k + 1
Hv,λ =


λ0 λ1 · · · λn−1
λ0v0 λ1v1 · · · λn−1vn−1
...
...
...
λ0v
d−1
0 λ1v
d−1
1 · · · λn−1v
d−1
n−1

 .
Generalised Reed-Solomon codes are decoded in the same way as Reed-Solomon codes by means of
the classical Berlekamp-Massey algorithm.
3.3 Subfield Subcode
The subfield subcode construction is another very important way to obtain a new class of codes. For
instance Goppa codes are subfield subcodes of generalised Reed-Solomon codes. In that particular
case, they are also called alternant codes.
Definition 10. Let Fq be subfield of Fq0 and let C be a code of length n over Fq0. The subfield
subcode C ′ of C over Fq is the vector space C ∩ F
n
q .
Obviously, any subfield subcode of quasi-cyclic code of order ℓ is also a quasi-cyclic code of the same
order. Another advantage of restricting ourselves to such subcodes is the possibility to obtain codes
with a better minimum distance which hence enables to correct more errors.
Definition 11 (Alternant code). Let Fq be a subfield of Fq0 and let Gk(v,λ) be a Generalised
Reed-Solomon code of dimension k over Fq. The alternant code A (v,λ) over Fq of Gk(v,λ) is the
subfield subcode of Gk(λ,v) over Fq.
4 Our New Variant
4.1 Description of the New Cryptosystem
The new variant of the MacEliece (or Niederreiter) cryptosystem we propose is not based on clas-
sical binary Goppa codes but rather on quasi-cyclic codes as in [11]. These codes, which are a
generalization of cyclic codes, offer the advantage of having a very compact representation. How-
ever it was recently proved in [21] that replacing quasi-cyclic codes in the McEliece cryptosystem
does not resist to a total break. This was made possible mainly because the secret permutation
that hides the structure of the secret quasi-cyclic code can be described with much less coefficients.
The secret permutation is then recovered by simply solving an over-constrained linear system. In
our new approach, we overcome this weakness by considering a more general kind of linear trans-
formations which not only reorder the columns of the secret generator matrix but also delete most
of them making their retrieval very hard in practice. We assume first that we have at our disposal
a family of MDS quasi-cyclic codes that we know how to decode (in practice we will consider Gen-
eralized reed-Solomon codes). (We recall that a [n, k, d]q code is Maximum Distance separable code
if d = n− k + 1.)
The construction starts by randomly picking such a quasi-cyclic codes C0 of length N = ℓN0,
and dimension K and order ℓ over a finite field Fq0 . The code C0 is equipped by t-bounded decoding
algorithm γ. We also assume that there exists an element β of order ℓ in Fq0 . Figure 5 gives KeyGen
algorithm of our variant. Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms are not given because they are exactly the
same as those of the original Niederreiter (or MacEliece) encryption scheme. The goal of KeyGen
algorithm is to construct a new quasi-cyclic code of length n = ℓn0 (with n0 << N0) and order ℓ
over a finite subfield Fq ⊂ Fq0 with q0 = q
r. The subfield-subcode has dimension N − r(N − K)
where r and N −K are chosen such that r(N −K) ∼ nrℓ, for nr an integer which represents the
number of rows needed to describe the quasi-cyclic matrix, in practice nr = 1, 2 or 3. This is done
thanks to four operations.
1. First, deleting (N0 − n0) random block columns of circulant matrices of H
′. We get hence a
shortened code C1 of length n = n0l.
2. Next, transforming C1 by means of the transformations given in Lemma 1. We obtain a new
code C2 of length n.
3. Taking a subfield subcode of C2 over Fq in order to get the public quasi-cyclic code C of length
n = n0ℓ and dimension n− r(N −K) (with r(N −K) ∼ nrℓ).
4. The quasi-cyclic code obtained is described through its dual matrix of dimension r(N−K) which
can be described through the ℓ-order quasi-cyclicity as a matrix H = [H i,j ] with 1 ≤ i ≤ nr
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n0 where H i,j is an ℓ× ℓ circulant matrix.
As we can see, the proposed cryptosystem uses circulant matrices to describe the codes. The public
key is formed by an nrℓ × n matrix over Fq, where n = ℓn0, formed by nr × n0, ℓ × ℓ circulant
matrices. It only needs nrℓ(n0 − nr) log2 q bits to be completely described in systematic form (See
Section 5 for the obtained values).
4.2 Application to Generalised Reed-Solomon Codes
We have presented in Section 4.1 a general method to build a public-key cryptosystem from a family
of quasi-cyclic codes. We give in this section how to effectively obtain quasi-cyclic codes. The idea
is to select as in [11] a family of cyclic codes equipped with an efficient decoding algorithm. A
good candidate is the family of Reed-Solomon codes. From this family, we generate by means of the
transformations defined in Lemma 1 many new quasi-cyclic codes. Recall that the resulting public
Fig. 5. KeyGen algorithm of the new variant of the Niederreiter cryptosystem
1. Choose a security parameter κ
2. Choose N0, ℓ, q, n0, r, nr and t with n0 < N0 such that Wf (q
r, N,K, t) ≥ 2κ and Wf (q, n, k, t) ≥ 2
κ where
N = ℓN0, (N −K)r ∼ nrℓ, n = ℓn0 and k = n− (N −K)r ∼ n− nrℓ. Set q0 = q
r.
3. Randomly pick a parity-check matrix H0 of a quasi-cyclic code C0 of length N , dimension K and order ℓ over Fq0
4. Randomly pick a n0-subset J ⊂ JN0
5. Delete from H ′ the circulant matrices H ′i,j such that i 6∈ J . Set H0 the resulting matrix.
6. Randomly pick an n0-tuple a of non zero elements of Fq0 . Set H1 = H0 × (Diag(a)⊗ Iℓ)
7. Let β be an element of Fq0 of order ℓ. Randomly pick an integer 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ− 1 and set
H2 = H1 ×
“
In0 ⊗ Diag(1, β
m
, β
2m
. . . , β
(ℓ−1)m)
”
8. Randomly pick Pπ ∈ Sn0 . Set H3 = H2 × (P π ⊗ Iℓ)
9. Randomly pick Pσ1 , . . . , Pσn0 in Tℓ. Set
H4 = H3 ×
0
B@
Pσ1 0
. . .
0 Pσn0
1
CA
10. Choose a subfield Fq ⊂ Fq0 Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωr} be an arbitrary basis of Fq0 over Fq. Decompose each entry of
H4 according to Ω. Set H5 the resulting nrℓ× n matrix with n = ℓn0
11. Transform H5 into an nrℓ× n matrix H
∗ = [H∗i,j ] where H
∗
i,j is an ℓ× ℓ circulant matrix
12. Randomly pick an invertible nrℓ × nrℓ matrix S = [S
∗
i,j ] for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ nr and Si,j a circulant ℓ × ℓ matrix.
Set H = S ×H∗. (Alternatively H can be put in standard form to decrease the size of the but the encryption
algorthim has to be slighlty modified (see [6]).
13. Output pk = (H , t) and sk = (S,H0, J,a,m, Pπ, Pσ1 , . . . , Pσn0 )
key is a randomly shortened alternant code denoted by G (J,a, βm, π, σ1, . . . , σn0) (Definiton 7)
when the underlying Reed-Solomon code is G . The matrix H0 is therefore defined by Equation (2).
5 Suggested Parameters and Performances
5.1 Suggested Parameters
We illustrate our construction with different sets of parameters in Table 1. The table sums up
the different parameters, the security entry is computed from the Canteaut-Chabaud algorithm
(log2 (Wf (q, n, k, t))), also taking account of the use of the order of quasi-cyclicity which can be
used with this attack simply by shifting the vector to decode (notice it only improves the attack
linearly by the order of quasi-cyclicity l and that until now this is the only way to use quasi-cyclicity
for the decoding attack - we also point the fact that for NTRU no real attack has been found based
on the quasi-cyclicity of the lattice). We give parameters with decoding security from 280 to 2116
with for instance public key size from 6, 500 bits for a 280 security to 11, 160 bits for a 2107 security.
These parameters show the adaptability of our system with a size of key which increases moderatly
relatively to the security of the system.
Remark that as usual for McEliece cryptosystem the parameters are easily scalable. The two
cases we consider are generalised Reed-Solomon codes over F220 and F216 . In the following cases the
codes are generated by quasi-cyclicity from one, two or three rows.
Example: Consider set of parameters A16: 2
16 − 1 = 51 × 1285, hence we can take l = 51,
N0 = (2
16 − 1)/51 = 1285. We consider the subfield F28 of F216 , hence r = 2. We take a GRS cyclic
code C0 with t = 25, which givesN = 2
16−1 andK = 216−1−50, hence we get r(N−K) = 100 ∼ 2.ℓ
with nr = 2 (the number of row eventually needed). Then we take n0 = 13 and keep only 13 blocks of
size ℓ among the 1285 blocks possible. We then obtain a quasi-cyclic GRS [13.51, 13.51−50, t = 25]216
code of order 51. We then apply linear transformations of Lemma 1 to obtain a code C1, and take
the subfield subcode of C1 from F216 to F28 . We hence obtain a code [13.51, 13.51− 100, t = 25]28 =
[663, 561, t = 25]28 code, we can check from the Canteaut-Chabaud algorithm that the security
(taking account of the quasi-cyclic order) is 280 and the size of the public key in systematic form is
8, 980 bits.
Table 1. Suggested parameters of generalised Reed-Solomon codes for different security levels
N = N0ℓ,K = N − 2t, d = 2t+ 1 Public code C [n, k,≥ 2t+ 1]
q0 ℓ N0 t Parameter n k q n0 n− k security Public key size (bits)
216
51 1,285 25 A16 663 561 2
8 13 2× 2× 2t 80 8,980
51 1,285 37 B16 663 510 2
8 13 3× 2× 2t 95 12,240
51 1,285 37 C16 1020 867 2
8 20 3× 2× 2t 116 20,800
85 771 42 D16 1105 935 2
4 13 2× 4× 2t 83 14,960
220
93 11,275 23 A20 744 651 2
10 8 2× 2t 80 6,510
93 11,275 46 B20 744 558 2
10 8 2× 2× 2t 107 11,160
75 13,981 36 C20 750 675 2
10 10 2× 2t 100 12,120
165 6,355 40 D20 1320 1155 2
5 8 4× 2t 90 11,480
Remark 1. The number of possible codes by our construction is very large:
(
N0
n0
)
2pn0n0! for F2p the
field of the larger code. For instance for parameters A16 we obtain 2
526 possible codes. The quasi-
cyclic structure of the codes permits to go easily from a McEliece type public key (a generator
matrix of code) to a Niedereiter type public key (a dual matrix of the code).
5.2 Performance
We implemented the encryption with the system A20 on GF (2
8) on 2.4 Ghz computer with 64 bits
architecture. The multiplication over GF (28) was tabulated in cache memory and all operations
were done octet by octet as a matrix vector product so that eventually the 64 bits structure was not
really enhanced. Overall the encryption speed was 15Mo/s, which corresponds to about 128 cycle
per octet.
This speed compares well with the implementation of [6] which speed was inferior with a factor
2 to what we obtain. Moreover our implementation can still be improved (probably by a factor 2
or 3) by taking account of the cyclic structure. Indeed rather than tabulating the multiplication
over the field (GF (28) in this case) it is possible to put in cache memory the multiplication of the
first row of the code by all elements of the base field. Since all the rows of the generator matrix
are obtained as cyclic shift from the first row it then possible to deduce all multiplied rows from
shifts of the multiplied first rows in cache. So that it is possible to profit by the 64 bits structure by
summation (but in 64 bits) of the multiplied shifted first rows and even enhance our performance.
For decryption we obtain similar speed of a few hundred cycle per octet as in [6] although we did
not yet optimized our implementation.
Our implementation speed compares of course very well with RSA-1024 and Elliptic Curves. An
interesting question is the comparison with NTRU. Although exact performance results are hard to
find, in term of encryption speed our system seems better with a factor 10 by comparison to known
performance of NTRU [6]. These good results comes from the fact that besides the matrix-vector
product in NTRU, one also needs to encrypt vectors with given weight which becomes in fact the
main cost (notice that the same problem arises for Niederreiter version of the scheme, but in our
case we only considered the McEliece scheme).
6 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the security of the new variant proposed in Section 4.1. We show that this
new system based on Reed-Solomon codes is not only resistant to a total break but also satisfies
the OW-CPA property.
6.1 Total Break
We review now all the existing attacks that aim at recovering the private key from public data.
These attacks which are also called structural attacks are listed below.
Brute force attack Recall that the private key is sk = (J,a,m, π, σ1, . . . , σn0) The set J which is a
subset of JN0 of cardinality n0. The vector a is n0-tuple of nonzero elements in Fq, the permutation
π belongs to Sn0 and each σi is in Tℓ. Note that a0 can be chosen to be equal to 1. Thus the private
key space contains n0!q
n0−1ℓn0+1
(
N0
n0
)
elements. This implies that the private key is out of reach by
exhaustively enumerating all the elements.
Attack exploiting the code equivalence. Another possible attack is to exploit the fact that
the public code is equivalent (Definition 2) to a subcode of a Reed-Solomon code. One may think
to employ the support splitting algorithm. However, one has first to find out the vector a and the
integer m. Moreover, one has also to guess the set J before applying this strategy. But the number
of such sets is again too high for being at reach by brute force search. Actually, we can show that
this issue forms an intractable problem called the equivalent punctured code problem. It was first
proposed in [28]. Surprisingly, it shows that if one allows to delete some random columns then the
problem becomes an NP-complete problem [28].
Definition 12 (Equivalent shortened code problem). Given an r × n matrix H over Fq and
an r×n′ matrix H ′ over Fq with n
′ < n, does there exist σ in Sn′ and J ⊂ Jn of cardinality n
′ such
that H ′ = H(J)× Pσ?
Unlike the permutation equivalence problem which is efficiently solved in practise by the support
splitting algorithm, there is no efficient algorithm that solves the equivalent shortened code problem.
The security of our new McEliece variant is related to the existence of such an algorithm.
Attack exploiting the generalised Reed-Solomon structure. Sidelnikov and Shestakov proved
in [26] that it is possible to completely recover the structure of Generalised Reed-Solomon codes
with time complexity in O(n3) where n is the length of the public code. This attack can be used
against any type of generalized Reed-Solomon code but uses the fact that the underlying matrix of
the Reed-Solomon code is completely known. In our case we do not directly use a GRS code but
a randomly shortened subfield subcode, which hence makes this attack unfeasible. It is worthwhile
remarking that if such an efficient (or a generalized attack) was to exist for alternant codes, then it
could be potentially used to break the McEliece cryptosystem since Goppa codes are a special case
of binary alternant codes.
Attack exploiting the quasi-cyclic structure. Recently a new structural attack appeared in
[21] that extracts the private key of the variant presented in [11]. This cryptosystem takes a binary
quasi-cyclic subcode of a BCH code of length n as the secret code. The structure is hidden by
a strongly constrained permutation in order to produce a quasi-cyclic public code. This implies
that the permutation transformation is completely described with n20 binary entries where n0 is the
quasi-cyclic index rather than n2 entries. The attack consists in taking advantage of the fact that
the secret is a subcode of completely known BCH code. One generates linear equations by exploiting
the public generator matrix and a known parity-check matrix of the BCH code so that one gets an
over-constrained linear system satisfied by the unknown permutation matrix.
We show how to adapt this attack to our variant. We start from a parity-check matrixH0 of the
Reed-Solomon code RK,N . We add (N0 − n0)ℓ zero columns to the public parity-check matrix H
in order to form another parity-check matrix H˜. By definition, we know that there exist an integer
1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ− 1 and an N0-tuple a of elements in Fq0 (not necessarily nonzero) such that the code C˜
defined by H˜ is permutation equivalent to a subcode of the generalised Reed-Solomon code defined
by the parity-check matrix H2
H2 =H0 × (Diag(a)⊗ Iℓ)×
(
In0 ⊗ Diag(1, β
m, β2m . . . , β(ℓ−1)m)
)
=H1 × (Diag(a)⊗ Iℓ)
where H1 = H0 ×
(
In0 ⊗ Diag(1, β
m, β2m . . . , β(ℓ−1)m)
)
. In other words, given a (quasi-circulant)
generator matrix G˜ of C˜ , we would like to find θ in SN0 and γ1, . . . , γn0 in Tℓ such that the following
equation holds:
H1 ×
((
Diag(a)× Pθ
)
⊗ Iℓ
)
×


Pγ1 0
. . .
0 Pγn0

× G˜ = 0. (3)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that m is known and Pγi = Iℓ. If we set Γ = Pθ×Diag(λ) then
an attacker has to solve the linear system given in Equation (3) where the unknowns are the N20
entries of Γ . It is important to note that there do exist a solution to Equation (3) that reveals both
a and the set J . Each row of G˜ must satisfy N −K = ℓ(N0 −K0) parity equations over Fq0 . But if
we decompose each row of H1 according to a basis Ω of Fq0 over Fq, we actually get r(N −K) =
rℓ(N0 − K0) parity equations. So the total number of equations is r(N − K)k = rℓ
2(N0 − K0)k0
where we assume that k = k0ℓ. For instance if we consider the parameters A16 we obtain 594, 441
unknowns and 61, 600 equations.
An attacker has therefore to reduce the number of unknowns in order to guess Γ . However, with
rℓ2(N0 −K0)k0 linear equations, an attacker can potentially guess any secret δ × δ matrix where
δ = ℓ
√
r(N0 −K0)k0. Another strategy is then to set N0 − δ random columns of Γ to zero and
then to solve the resulting linear system. This method would give the right solution if only if the n0
columns that intervene in the construction of the shortened alternant code are not set to zero. The
success probability of this method is therefore
(N0−n0δ−n0 )
(N0δ )
. Additionally, for each random choice, one
has to solve a linear system with a time complexity O(s′2δ3) with coefficients in F2s′ . In practice
this attack does not give better results than direct decoding attack.
6.2 On the One-Wayness
We prove in this section that the primitive of our variant is also OW-CPA under the assumption that
it is computationally impossible to distinguish a random quasi-cyclic code from an alternant quasi-
cyclic code. We show that decoding an arbitrary quasi-cyclic code is also an NP-Hard problem. For
doing so, we propose another decisional problem called quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding. We prove
that this new problem is also NP-Complete.
Definition 13 (Quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding). Given ℓ > 1 (we avoid the case l = 1 which
corresponds to a degenerate case) matrices A1, . . . , Aℓ of size r
∗ × n∗ over Fq, an integer w < ℓn
∗
and a word z in Fℓr
∗
q . Let A be the ℓr
∗ × ℓn∗ matrix:
A =


A1 · · · · · · Aℓ
Aℓ A1 · · · Aℓ−1
...
. . .
. . .
...
A2 · · · Aℓ A1


Does there exist e in Fℓn
∗
q of weight wt(e) ≤ w such that A× e
T = z?
Proposition 1. The quasi-cyclic syndrome decoding problem is NP-Complete.
Proof. We consider an instance H, w and z of the syndrome decoding problem. We define w∗ = 2w,
the 2r-tuple z∗ = (z,z) and the following 2r × 2n matrix A:
A =
[
H 0
0 H
]
.
Clearly A, z∗ and w∗ are constructed in polynomial time. Assume now that there exist e in Fnq of
weight wt(e) ≤ w such that H × eT = z. Then wt(e∗) ≤ w∗ and A× e∗T = z∗.
Conversely assume that there exists e∗ in F2nq of weight wt(e
∗) ≤ w∗ such that A × e∗T = z∗.
If we denote e∗ = (e1, e2) where e1 is formed by the first n symbols and e2 by the last n symbols.
Obviously we have either e1 or e2 of weight ≤ w
∗/2 and for both of them H × ej
T = z.
This result ensures that in the worse decoding random quasi-cyclic codes is a difficult problem.
One may think that classical algorithms can be modified by taking into account the quasi-cyclic
structure of the codes. This fact can be favorably used to indeed improve performances of generic
algorithms, and one can reasonably expect to decrease by a factor the order of quasi-cyclicity ℓ the
work factor of the general decoding algorithms. Note that the proposed parameters in Table 5.1
take into account this fact.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a new way to reduce the size of the public key for code-based cryp-
tosystems like McEliece or Niederreiter schemes by the use of quasi-cyclic alternant codes and very
strongly punctured codes. The use of quasi-cyclic codes permits to reach a public key of as low as
6500 bits for a security of 280 or 11,000 bits for 2107. We prove the NP-completeness of decoding
quasi-cyclic codes. An implementation of our scheme ran at 120 Mb/s for encryption speed which
makes it far better than RSA or NTRU cryptosystems (see [6] for comparisons). Such low param-
eters together with the high speed of the system open the doors to new potential applications for
code-based cryptography in smart cards for instance, where such an algorithm can be used for key
exchange or authentication.
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